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Climate Change and the States:
Constitutional Issues Arising from State Climate Protection Leadership
by Robert K. Huffman & Jonathan M. Weisgall*

A

Introduction

s state, local, and federal legislators develop policies to
address global climate change, the United States may
soon face the difficult political and legal necessity of
reconciling multiple—and potentially conflicting—state, local,
regional, and federal climate change programs into a comprehensive national policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This
Article reviews some of these programs and explores several
constitutional issues that may arise from state programs designed
to combat climate change.
The causes of climate change
are not completely understood,
but there is now widespread
agreement that humans are having an impact on the climate, primarily from carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases (“GHG”)
that are emitted from burning
fossil fuels. As these gases accumulate in the atmosphere, they
trap heat close to the earth’s surface, causing myriad effects on
our delicate ecosystem.
Regulators and policymakers at the local, state, federal, and
international levels are taking various actions to understand climate change and reduce GHG emissions. The first major action
occurred in 1990, with the release of the first report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”).1 This was the
first time that a detailed scientific endeavor was undertaken to
study the climate change phenomenon. The IPCC’s first report
led to international action, with the creation of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). The
UNFCCC is an international environmental treaty, adopted in
1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development in Brazil.2 It created a UN Secretariat to oversee
the Convention and substantively serves as a framework for further negotiations on detailed protocols aimed at reducing worldwide GHG emissions.

by the required number of parties that represent a specified minimum percentage of worldwide GHG emissions.3
The Kyoto Protocol is in effect only through 2012. Negotiations are currently underway to craft a successor agreement that
would operate through at least 2020. This was the focus of the
December 2007 Conference of the Parties 13 in Bali, Indonesia.
These meetings resulted in an agreement, now known as the Bali
Roadmap, to complete further negotiations over the coming two
years.4
The United States, however, has not adopted the Kyoto
Protocol, objecting to the inclusion of industrialized nations
(Annex I Parties) but not the
developing world. Seeing this as
a competitive disadvantage that
could cause significant harm to
the U.S. economy, the government has refused to adopt the
binding emissions limits called
for in the Kyoto Protocol. Aside
from the United States, every
industrialized nation, including the European Union, has
adopted the Kyoto Protocol.
The Kyoto Protocol provides three “flexibility mechanisms”
that allow countries to reduce the costs of achieving their emissions reduction targets. These mechanisms are the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”), Joint Implementation (“JI”), and
emissions trading. The CDM allows Annex I Parties to implement projects that reduce emissions in non-Annex I Parties, in
return for Certified Emission Reduction (“CER”) credits.5 JI
allows Annex I Parties to implement projects in other Annex
I Parties that either reduce emissions or enhance carbon sinks,
in return for Emission Reduction Units (“ERU”).6 CDM and JI
projects are subject to a verification and certification process, in
order to ensure the legitimacy of any CER or ERU credits that

Aside from the
United States, every
industrialized nation,
including the European
Union, has adopted the
Kyoto Protocol.

Kyoto Protocol
Five years after the UNFCCC was created, at the Third
Conference of the Parties in Kyoto, Japan, an agreement was
reached to create binding emission reduction targets for industrialized nations. This 1997 agreement, known as the Kyoto Protocol, came into force on February 16, 2005, after being ratified
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are generated by the projects. Emissions trading, the final mechanism, is a market-based strategy for reducing GHG emissions.

Emissions Trading Systems
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I Parties may develop
internal emissions trading markets or link together with other
Annex I Parties to create larger trading markets. An emissions
trading market contains a system-wide cap on emissions that
decreases over time, thus ensuring that overall GHG emissions
within the system decrease as well. The system-wide cap and
market features give rise to the general term cap-and-trade to
describe these emissions markets.
The emissions credits that can be traded are of a standard
form, with each credit equal to one metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions.7 This
is the basic unit of currency in
the emissions reduction world.8
In designing and operating carbon markets, the single most
important issue is consistency
and quality control in measuring emissions. If a tonne from
one facility is not equal to a
tonne from a neighboring facility, the market cannot operate
properly. Therefore, without adequate monitoring, verification,
and reporting procedures, emissions markets will fail to deliver
actual emissions reductions.9

the Kyoto Protocol, the EU-ETS will continue to operate, at least
in a modified form. In January 2008, the European Commission
released proposed rules for the next phase of the EU-ETS, which
will run from 2013 to 2020.11 The proposals will change several
details in the operation of the market and include a provision
that would allow the EU-ETS to link with trading systems in
countries that have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, something
that is not permitted in the current phase. This is interpreted as
a clear overture to the United States to link its future emissions
market(s) to the EU-ETS.

U.S. Federal GHG Policy
The federal government has yet to pass legislation or
issue regulations covering GHG emissions. In January 2007 a
group of major corporations and
prominent environmental groups
formed the United States Climate
Action Partnership (“US CAP”)
and released a report entitled A
Call for Action.12 Its goal is to
put pressure on Congress to adopt
legislation regulating GHG emissions, including a comprehensive
cap-and-trade program. While it
may seem odd for a group of the
largest corporations in America to advocate for potentially costly
regulation, they have come to realize that regulatory uncertainty
and its concomitant risks may exact a greater long-term economic cost than comprehensive—but definite—legislation.
As of this writing, no comprehensive federal climate change
legislation has been adopted. One major cap-and-trade bill,
sponsored by Senators Lieberman and Warner,13 is considered
the leading proposal on Capitol Hill, but there is only a small
likelihood of final passage in 2008.
The Energy Independence and Security Act,14 signed into
law in December 2007, contains several provisions that are
intended to reduce GHG emissions, but it falls short of the comprehensive legislation advocated by US CAP and others. The Act
includes the first increase in Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(“CAFE”) standards for automobiles since they were enacted in
1975, requiring average fuel economy of thirty-five miles per
gallon in 2020.15 It also includes provisions to improve energy
efficiency in homes and buildings,16 a renewable fuel standard
(mandating the production of at least thirty-six billion gallons
of biofuels by 2020),17 and other provisions to meet President
Bush’s “20 in 10” challenge for reducing gasoline usage by
twenty percent in ten years.
A recent House Committee on Energy and Commerce white
paper looked at the proper role of federal, state, and local governments in any comprehensive carbon regulation scheme. 18
Working under the assumption that the federal government
would eventually enact a cap-and-trade program like the Lieberman-Warner bill, the white paper revealed potential situations in
which state and local leadership could lead to either increased
emissions, increased overall costs, or both. It makes the argument that “climate change is a global, not local, problem, perhaps

No comprehensive federal
climate change legislation
has been adopted.

European Union Emissions Trading System
The most significant market developed under the Kyoto
Protocol flexibility mechanisms is the European Union Emissions Trading System (“EU-ETS”).10 The EU-ETS, which
began operation in 2005, is comprised of twenty-seven European
member nations and sets a cap on the total emissions that can
be generated from power stations, certain large industrial facilities, and oil refineries. Facilities covered by the EU-ETS must
report their total emissions annually and surrender a number of
allowances equal to their total GHG emissions. Some allowances are distributed to facilities for free, others are auctioned
by governments, and others can be purchased on the market
from traders, governments, or other entities that possess them
(including allowances generated by credits in CDM or JI projects). If a facility has extra allowances after it surrenders those
necessary to match its annual emissions output, it can sell them
for profit. This provides an economic incentive to consistently
reduce emissions at a facility. On the other hand, if a facility
does not have enough allowances to cover its surrender requirement, it will have to purchase additional allowances to make up
the shortfall. This serves as an incentive to reduce GHG emissions, particularly if the cost of the allowances in the market is
greater than the cost of making modifications that lead to emissions reductions.
The current phase of the EU-ETS runs through 2012, to
coincide with the timeframe of the operation of the Kyoto Protocol. Regardless of whether there is a global agreement to replace
7
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providing less need for allowing States to be more stringent.”19
As a result, “a more stringent State program may just shift the
location of, rather than decrease, national emissions . . . .” 20 This
would occur when regulated entities move their operations from
states with higher (i.e., more expensive to comply with) standards to ones that follow the lower, federal standards.
The white paper does note, however, that state and local
authorities do have a significant, complementary role to play in
the effort to reduce GHG emissions. For example, building codes
that mandate the use of better insulation in new homes would
cause higher initial prices for consumers, but provide long-term
savings as a result of lower energy bills. These measures “could
capture . . . otherwise lost or uncovered emission reductions, and
thereby decrease the societal cost of achieving greenhouse gas
reductions.”21 The white paper also recognizes the importance
of adequate and efficient monitoring, reporting, and verification
of emissions. “It is probably more efficient to authorize State,
Tribal, and/or local governments to inspect sources to determine compliance with national monitoring and record-keeping
requirements than it would be to leave that exclusively to Federal inspectors.”22
Many state leaders, frustrated at slow federal action to
address climate change, are implementing both comprehensive and piece-meal programs at the state level to help reduce
GHG emissions. The following section discusses the actions
that states have taken on their own to reduce GHG emissions,
focusing heavily on cap-and-trade programs. Next, this Article
raises and analyzes the constitutional issues that may arise as a
result of state responses to this pressing global problem, focusing heavily on the constitutional issues raised by attempts to link
emissions trading systems among states and between states and
foreign parties.

U.S. State-Level Actions
Cap-and-Trade Programs
Although the United States is not a signatory to the Kyoto
Protocol, there are several efforts underway to establish state- or
regional-level trading systems. These follow not only the model
of the EU-ETS, but also other successful domestic cap-and-trade
programs administered by the EPA, including the Acid Rain
Program.23
California is in the process of establishing its own capand-trade program. In September 2006, California adopted the
Global Warming Solutions Act, also known as A.B. 32.24 This
law, in part, allows the state to establish a cap-and-trade program
to help meet the goal of capping the state’s emissions at 1990
levels by 2020 and eventually reaching eighty percent below
1990 levels by 2050.25 The program would be administered by
the California Air Resources Board (“CARB”), which is in the
process of adopting a scoping plan to identify California’s primary strategies for reducing GHG emissions under A.B. 32. The
goal would be to have the cap-and-trade program operating by
January 1, 2012.26 Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger has openly
expressed an interest in linking any cap-and-trade program, once
it is open for business, with the EU-ETS market.27
Winter 2008

In addition to California’s intrastate efforts, three interstate
groups are currently in the process of establishing carbon markets. One project, known as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”),28 was initially formed in 2003 and is now made
up of ten states in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic: Maine, New
Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland. In addition, several eastern Canadian provinces have expressed interest
in joining RGGI.
The consortium administering RGGI has published model
rules for each of the states to adopt, and all ten states are in the
process of adopting them in statutory or regulatory form. The
goal is to have the market operating by January 2009. At this
point, it appears likely that the market will be ready to open at
that time, although all ten states may not be participating at the
outset, as a few may have outstanding issues to resolve in the
early stages of the program.
The second multi-state group, known as the Western Climate Initiative (“WCI”), consists of seven Western states and
two Canadian provinces: Arizona, California, Montana, New
Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, British Columbia, and
Manitoba. The WCI was established in February 2007, and as
a result is not as far along in the process as RGGI. WCI is currently in the design phase, having completed basic design principles and established a year-long work-plan.29 Its goal is to have
the design of the market-based mechanism completed in August
2008. Based on this timeline, it is unlikely that the WCI will be
able to establish a functioning market before 2011 or 2012.
A third group, consisting of nine Midwestern states and
the Canadian province of Manitoba, signed the Midwestern
Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord in November of
2007, which is designed to establish greenhouse gas reduction
targets, a regional cap-and-trade protocol, and a regional system
to track and manage greenhouse gas emissions.30

Renewable Portfolio Standards
A renewable portfolio standard (“RPS”) is a state-level
mandate requiring electric utilities to obtain a certain percentage
of their power from renewable resources. Twenty-four states and
the District of Columbia currently have RPSs, while four other
states have non-binding goals for adopting renewable energy.31
A typical RPS might call for having twenty percent of
energy produced from renewable resources by 2020. Currently,
Minnesota and Oregon have the highest standards calling for
twenty-five percent renewable energy production by 2025.32
The renewable resources that qualify for state RPS programs
generally include wind, solar (concentrated and photovoltaic), geothermal, and biomass. Nuclear power does not satisfy
RPS requirements and cannot be used to meet the renewable
standards.

Auto Emissions Regulations
The Clean Air Act (“CAA”) prohibits states from issuing
their own auto emissions regulations. There is one exception that
applies only to California, as California was the only state regulating auto emissions prior to the enactment of the CAA in 1966.
8

Section 209(b) of the Act allows California to seek a waiver
from the EPA, which shall be granted unless “the Administrator
finds that—(A) the determination of the State is arbitrary and
capricious, (B) such State does not need such State standards
to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions, or (C) such
State standards and accompanying enforcement procedures are
not consistent with section 202(a)” of the CAA.33 Other states
then have the choice of adopting the federal rule or the California rule.
Citing the fact that automobile emissions account for
roughly forty percent of GHG
emissions in California, the California Greenhouse Gas Reduction Bill of 2002, known as A.B.
1493, requires CARB to adopt
“regulations that achieve the
maximum feasible reduction
and cost-effective reduction of
greenhouse gases from motor
vehicles.” 34 The regulations
are not fuel economy standards
per se, but instead regulate the
amount of GHG emissions that
automobiles sold in the state
may produce.
In 2004, CARB promulgated regulations pursuant to
A.B. 1493 calling for a reduction
in emissions by automobiles totaling over fifty million tonnes of
carbon dioxide by 2030.35 This equates to a twenty-seven percent reduction in automobile emissions by 2030. California formally sought a waiver from the EPA in December 2005.36 Since
California adopted its regulations, sixteen other states have followed its lead and passed laws requiring automobiles to meet the
California standards.
After the April 2007 Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,37 in which Massachusetts won a significant victory
that formally establishes EPA’s authority to regulate GHG gases
as pollutants, Governor Schwarzenegger met with EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson to encourage EPA to grant California’s
waiver application. However, in December 2007, Administrator
Johnson notified California that the waiver application would be
denied, on the grounds that California’s situation does not meet
the “compelling and extraordinary conditions” test.38 Identifying global climate change as a worldwide problem and citing
the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007,39 which
increased CAFE standards, the EPA determined that California’s
more strict GHG emissions reduction rule may not be enforced.
This was the first time, after more than fifty successful applications, that a waiver request under Section 209(b) was denied by
the EPA.40
California and several other states have since sued the EPA,
and the case is currently pending in federal court.41 For advocates
of state action to slow the impacts of climate change, the waiver
denial was both a significant blow to their efforts and a rallying

cry. Regardless of one’s views on the merits of the EPA decision, the decision underscores the importance of clarifying the
role of the states, as this waiver decision is likely to be a major
court battle lasting several years and costing millions of dollars.

Greenhouse Gas Performance Standards
In January 2007, California became the first state to adopt
a greenhouse gas performance standard (“GGPS”).42 This is a
facility-based emissions standard, affecting electric utilities,
which requires that all new long-term baseload generation commitments in California produce
no more emissions than a combined gas cycle turbine plant.43
It prohibits load-serving entities
(investor-owned utilities, energy
service providers, and community choice aggregators) from
entering into long-term financial commitments (five years
or more) for baseload generation with higher than proscribed
emissions, regardless of the type
of fuel used in the plant.44
This means that no new
coal-fired plants can be built
in California, nor can existing
plants make significant capital
improvements that do not conform to the GGPS. In addition, it prohibits California utilities
from contracting to import power from out of state that does not
comply with the emissions requirements of the GGPS.45

When states take actions
to regulate greenhouse
gases, it raises questions
about the extent of
state authority to regulate
the economy and
the environment.
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Constitutional Issues
The United States’ system of federalism allows the federal
and state governments to share power in certain areas, while
each maintains exclusive areas where the other may not regulate. The power of the federal government is constrained by the
Constitution and does not include general police powers, which
are reserved to the states.46 State governments, however, may
not regulate certain aspects of interstate and foreign commerce,
foreign affairs, and other areas of reserved federal power.
When states take actions to regulate greenhouse gases, it
raises questions about the extent of state authority to regulate
the economy and the environment. Linking emissions trading
programs or enacting auto emissions regulations brings states to
the far end of their regulatory authority, given the transborder
nature of emission trading and carbon dioxide emissions generally. This section explores the constitutional issues that can
potentially arise from state actions to reduce GHG emissions.

Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause, Article I, § 8, cl. 3, gives the federal
government the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States[.]”47 The Supreme Court
has long considered the Commerce Clause to be “an implicit
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

restraint on state authority, even in the absence of a conflicting
federal statute.”48 This concept is known as the Dormant Commerce Clause—wherein the Constitution acts as a prohibition
on certain types of state actions that affect interstate commerce,
invalidating the state law by negative implication.49
Although the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has
gained widespread acceptance, at least two current Supreme
Court justices (Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas) reject it altogether. Regardless of these two justices, it is highly unlikely that
a majority of the Court would reject the Dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine. Were the doctrine to be rejected by the Court,
state actions would never be invalidated for conflicting with
unexercised congressional power under the Commerce Clause,
but would be subject to invalidation only for express or implied
preemption by federal law.
The basic test for whether a state law violates the Commerce
Clause is to look first at whether the law discriminates on its face
against out-of-state entities or transactions.50 If there is facial
discrimination, which essentially means a protectionist measure
that is written in a manner that singles out foreign entities or
transactions for disadvantageous treatment when compared to
their in-state counterparts, then the state law will be invalidated.51 If there is no facial discrimination, the state law can still
run afoul of the Commerce Clause if it places unwarranted burdens on interstate commerce in a particular application or range
of applications.52 “Where the statute regulates even-handedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.”53
A linked cap-and-trade program may raise questions of discrimination. One of the biggest issues with establishing regional
cap-and-trade programs is “leakage,” which occurs when a regulated entity imports cheaper, higher-polluting power from an
area outside the program to evade cap obligations. For example,
if an electrical utility in a state covered by RGGI did not possess
enough allowances for the current year, and it was more economical to purchase coal-fired electricity from the neighboring
state than to buy allowances on the open market, the emissions
produced by the neighboring utility company would “leak” into
the regulated space of the cap-and-trade system when the electricity was purchased by the RGGI-covered company.
This leakage issue creates a serious problem for regulators. If the trading system allows or remains silent on importing
power from states that leave GHG emissions unregulated, the
credibility of the program as a whole will become suspect. At
the same time, if the regional system were to attempt to ban the
purchase of any power from non-member states, there would be
at least a colorable argument of facial discrimination. In order
to avoid these problems, the designers of regional cap-and-trade
programs like RGGI will have to find innovative solutions that
can protect the integrity of the emissions reduction mechanisms
while at the same time avoiding potential constitutional pitfalls.
Linking a state or regional cap-and-trade program with a
foreign trading system like the EU-ETS would raise unique conWinter 2008

stitutional issues not present in a wholly domestic linkage situation. Emission trading linkages with foreign parties would create
a whole host of problems, from verification and standardization
of credits at an international level to accounting and securities
disclosure laws and regulations. Credits created by European
entities would require some sort of regulation under federal
securities and/or commodities law. The federal government
would have a good argument that states should not be involved
in activities over which they do not have full control. Because a
state cannot independently regulate securities and commodities
markets, it may be impossible for a state or group of states to
provide adequate oversight of a market linked to international
participants.
In addition, the Dormant Commerce Clause can potentially
affect attempts to institute greenhouse gas performance standards. This would not be a discrimination issue, as the performance standards are facially neutral. Rather, courts would have
to look at whether the performance standards unduly burden
interstate commerce. If California’s rules prohibit long term contracts for the in-state sale of energy from out-of-state coal-fired
plants, out-of-state producers are likely to cry foul and sue over
the lost business from California’s utilities. At that point, the
courts would have to weigh the relative benefits of California’s
standards against the burden they place on interstate commerce.

Compacts Clause
The Compacts Clause, Article I, § 10, cl. 3, reads in part:
“No state shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . enter into
any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
power[.]”54
In reviewing claims under the Compacts Clause, courts
look generally to whether states are attempting to enhance their
power at the expense of the federal government.
Where an agreement is not ‘directed to the formation
of any combination tending to the increase of political
power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States,’ it
does not fall within the scope of the Clause and will not
be invalidated for lack of congressional consent.55
The first question that courts look at is whether a contractual
arrangement, such as a cap-and-trade system, reaches the point
of being a “compact” under the Compacts Clause. If it is a compact, then it generally must be approved by Congress or it will
be invalid.56 Once approved by Congress, it reaches the level
of federal law. Thus, for an unapproved state-to-state or stateto-foreign-party relationship to be valid, it must not reach the
formality of being a “compact” for these purposes.
To answer the first question, whether an arrangement is an
agreement or compact, the courts look to the general indicia of
a compact. The Supreme Court summarized the relevant factors
in Northeast Bancorp v. Federal Reserve,57 a decision involving
an agreement by holding companies to purchase banks:
The . . . statutes . . . both require reciprocity and impose
a regional limitation . . . . But several of the classic indicia of a compact are missing. No joint organization or
body has been established to regulate regional banking
10

or for any other purpose. Neither statute is conditioned
on action by the other State, and each State is free to
modify or repeal its law unilaterally. Most importantly,
neither statute requires a reciprocation of the regional
limitation.58
From the passage above, one can draw some general criteria
for determining whether a contractual relationship is an agreement or compact. There should be some sort of joint organization or body to govern the agreement, if necessary. It should be
binding; that is, no state can freely remove itself from the agreement. And it must require a reciprocity of the regional limitation,
meaning that one party cannot agree to a nationwide program
while another believes the agreement only covers a handful of
states.
Regarding a regional cap-and-trade program, courts are
unlikely to find that RGGI or a similar program is a compact,
unless the agreement contains language that conditions actions
(in one state) on actions by other states and is not freely revocable by participant states. It appears, based on Northeast
Bancorp, that a voluntary union, which allows for a state to back
out should it not want to participate, would not be considered a
compact for the purposes of the Clause.
However, it is difficult to see how a linked international
cap-and-trade framework could be crafted so as not to constitute a compact or even a treaty, which would be impermissible
under Article I, § 10, cl. 1, regardless of the presence or absence
of congressional approval. In order to have a properly functioning linkage between markets, there would need to be guarantees regarding enforceability and permanence. Without legally
enforceable guarantees about the quality of the credits being
traded, the markets are unlikely to succeed. There would be a
serious problem, for example, if an offset project in California
created credits that were purchased by a steel manufacturer in
France, and California de-linked itself from the markets. The
problem of how the French manufacturer would account for the
credits in the absence of a monitoring or verification mechanism
to account for what is happening in California is a significant
one. The only way to ensure the integrity of the credits being
traded in the marketplace is to create a framework that is robust
enough to protect all of the parties involved. This would presumably include the inability to voluntarily leave the program and
would be most easily accomplished with some sort of central
emissions registry that aggregates and processes data from all
participants. These components are almost certain to create a
compact under the Compacts Clause, which would then require
congressional approval in order to be valid.

Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause, Article VI, cl. 2, defines the Constitution and laws made “in Pursuance thereof” as “the supreme
Law of the Land[.]”59 This provision allows federal law to preempt state law in certain circumstances.
“Even without an express provision for preemption, we
have found that state law must yield to a congressional Act in
at least two circumstances,” the Supreme Court noted in U.S.
v. Locke.60 “When Congress intends federal law to ‘occupy the
11

field,’ state law in that area is preempted. And even if Congress
has not occupied the field, state law is naturally preempted to the
extent of any conflict with a federal statute.”61
A presumption of non-preemption arises in disputes involving the traditional police powers of the states; despite the presumption, even the police powers will yield when Congress
clearly intends to supersede state law.62 In addition, when there
is a history of significant federal presence in the area of regulation, there is no presumption of state law validity.63
With a cap-and-trade system, the question is whether any
federal law creates a conflict or if the federal government otherwise occupies the field. At this point, Congress has not passed
any legislation that would present a direct conflict with a multistate cap-and-trade system. Indeed, the federal government has
been remarkably absent from the field of greenhouse gas regulation in general.
In the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA,64 the federal government’s inaction becomes even more stark. The Court noted that
“EPA has not identified any Congressional action that conflicts
in any way with the regulation of greenhouse gases from new
motor vehicles.”65 Although issued in the context of federal
regulations rather than state statutes, the point is the same: the
federal government has not taken efforts to regulate GHG emissions. Massachusetts v. EPA held that EPA has the authority
to regulate GHG emissions from automobiles because they fit
within the statutory definition of “air pollutant” under § 202(a)
(1).66 The case was remanded to the EPA for the agency to either
make a finding of endangerment and regulate auto emissions or
provide a reasoned judgment as to why GHGs do not contribute
to global warming and can thus escape regulation.67
Even if the EPA decides to regulate GHG emissions from
autos, that would not necessarily provide a conflict for a capand-trade program. Most proposals for cap-and-trade programs
only regulate tailpipe emissions indirectly. If they capture the
transportation sector, it is done upstream through regulating
the fuel industry, rather than limiting actual vehicle emissions.
As a result, it is unlikely that any forthcoming rule stemming
from Massachusetts v. EPA would preempt state cap-and-trade
initiatives.
The best case for federal preemption would arise if the
federal government instituted a similar cap-and-trade system
or other form of comprehensive carbon emissions regulation.
Any program that created a nationwide price for carbon would
likely be interpreted as directly conflicting with state programs;
in the alternative, courts would probably hold that federal efforts
occupy the field of GHG regulation. But lacking such a program,
as is currently the case, it is difficult to see any way in which
a state-organized cap-and-trade program could be preempted
under the Supremacy Clause.
Some congressional leaders are advocating for express preemption in any future comprehensive cap-and-trade bill. The
Dingell-Boucher white paper,68 which discusses the role of
federal, state, and local governments in efforts to reduce GHG
emissions, makes the case for express preemption. “[O]nce a
national, economy-wide cap-and-trade program is adopted, State
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

or regional cap-and-trade programs may interfere with the efficient functioning of the Federal cap-and-trade program[.]”69 As a
result, “Chairman Dingell has made it very clear that he believes
that motor vehicle greenhouse gas standards should be set by
the Federal Government, not by State governments[.]”70 In addition, the analysis finds that compliance costs and overall system
costs (including regulatory overhead) are likely to be higher in
any duplicative system of federal and state/regional regulation.71
While the current version of the Lieberman-Warner bill actually encourages and provides incentives for states to take actions
above and beyond the federal cap-and-trade program,72 there is
a possibility that an express preemption clause could be part of
any final bill.
The Supreme Court recently looked at the scope of express
preemption of state laws, which may be relevant as applied to
future GHG regulations.73 In Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor
Transp. Ass’n, several transport carrier associations sued Maine
over regulations governing the conduct of carriers that deliver
packages containing tobacco, as a way to help prevent youth
from purchasing cigarettes through mail-order retailers. Federal
motor carrier law expressly preempts any state from “enact[ing]
or enforc[ing] a law . . . related to a price, route, or service of any
motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.”74
The state law, for example, required carriers to utilize a recipient-verification service, to ensure that the person who ordered
the tobacco is also the recipient, and that the recipient is at least
eighteen years old.75
In holding that the state law was preempted, the court noted
that “to interpret the federal law to permit these, and similar,
state requirements could easily lead to a patchwork of state service-determining laws, rules, and regulations. That state regulatory patchwork is inconsistent with Congress’s major legislative
effort to leave such decisions, where federally unregulated, to
the competitive marketplace.”76 This line of reasoning could be
relevant, particularly for state efforts to regulate GHG emissions
from automobiles.
Although there has not been affirmative congressional
action to deregulate GHG emissions, as there was with the motor
carrier industry, the threat of inconsistent state regulations is a
significant tool for the federal government to yield. The threat
of a patchwork of state laws was one of the major reasons EPA
Administrator Johnson decided to reject California’s application
for a waiver—even though there could never be more than just
the federal standard and the California standard in that instance.
The easiest way to prevent the threat of a patchwork of standards
is to include in any federal legislation an express preemption
clause that prohibits states from acting in a given area.77 Should
the federal government adopt comprehensive carbon legislation,
it is likely to include some level of express preemption of state
laws to ensure a consistent approach for the entire country. This
will inevitably lead to legal battles that delay the implementation
of any comprehensive carbon regulation program.

Interference with Foreign Affairs
The power to conduct foreign affairs is vested exclusively
in the federal government. Aspects of the power are constituWinter 2008

tionally divided between the President in Article II (e.g., power
to make treaties) and the Congress in Article I (e.g., power to
raise an army, declare war). States do not play a role in foreign
affairs, as it is important for the federal government to be able to
speak with one voice on behalf of the national interest for matters involving foreign affairs.
Generally, the only cases where courts have struck down
laws as interfering with foreign affairs power are “state or local
laws purporting to set up their own authorities as mini-statedepartments, with power to oversee and either approve or disapprove foreign regimes or the negotiation efforts of the U.S.
Executive Branch[.]”78
In Zschernig v. Miller,79 the Supreme Court invalidated
an Oregon law that prevented a nonresident alien from inheriting property unless certain conditions were met—primarily,
a reciprocal right for Americans in the alien’s country and the
assurance that any property received in Oregon would not be
confiscated at home. Noting that states are the typical forum
for probate matters, the Court still found the law problematic.
“The several States, of course, have traditionally regulated the
descent and distribution of estates. But those regulations must
give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation’s foreign policy.” 80 Zschernig involved a citizen of East Germany, a
country with which the United States had no treaties regarding
inheritance. Regardless, “even in absence of a treaty, a State’s
policy may disturb foreign relations.” 81
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council 82 is the first in
a line of recent foreign affairs cases that focus on state attempts
to limit contact with foreign countries. The Crosby court heard
a challenge to a Massachusetts law that prohibited state entities
from buying goods or services from companies doing business
with Burma.83 At the time the law was passed, there was no similar federal prohibition, although a federal law providing for sanctions on Burma was enacted a few months later. Although the
Court spoke specifically of the Supremacy Clause, the decision’s
rationale focused heavily on how the Massachusetts law tied the
President’s hands and thus reduced his leverage against Burma.
We need not get into any general consideration of limits of state action affecting foreign affairs to realize
that the President’s maximum power to persuade rests
on his capacity to bargain for the benefits of access
to the entire national economy without exception for
enclaves fenced off willy-nilly by inconsistent political
tactics.84
The Crosby reasoning was followed recently in an Illinois case.85 The district court there looked at an Illinois law
that regulated contact with and investment in Sudan and determined that the state law was unconstitutional, based primarily
on Supremacy Clause grounds. There was, however, extensive
discussion of the foreign affairs powers in the decision. Understanding that the federal government has a unique and exclusive
role in carrying out the country’s foreign policy, the court noted
that “the degree of impact a state law has or might have on the
national government’s conduct of foreign affairs is the relevant
inquiry.”86 In National Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias,
12

requiring pension funds to divest from Sudan, while potentially
raising difficulties for the fund managers, did not interfere with
the federal government’s authority to conduct foreign affairs.87
The Giannoulias ruling also contains dicta that is supportive of state efforts to reach non-discriminatory agreements with
foreign entities: the court indicates that “it does not appear that
state and local governments are prohibited from entering into
‘sister state’ agreements or other bilateral agreements with subnational foreign governments or foreign trade associations.” 88
Finally, in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi,89 the
Supreme Court extended the ruling in Crosby to areas where
there was no explicit federal statute, but merely executive agreements between the President and heads of foreign states. Garamendi involved a California law requiring any insurer in the state
to disclose information about all policies sold in Europe between
1920 and 1945. This was seen as a way of ensuring that claims
belonging to Holocaust victims were paid to any survivors and
their heirs living in California.
President Clinton, however, had made executive agreements with Germany, Austria, and France so that all claims
against German insurance companies relating to the Holocaust
would be heard by an international commission established for
that purpose.90 The Court noted that the President has considerable authority in the area of foreign relations and can act independently of Congress. “While Congress holds express authority
to regulate public and private dealings with other nations in its
war and foreign commerce powers, in foreign affairs the President has a degree of independent authority to act.” 91 Thus, congressional silence does not undermine the executive agreements,
which can, even without an explicit conflict, preempt state laws.
Garamendi was a 5-4 decision, with Justices Rehnquist and
O’Connor in the majority. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which
was joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas, focused
on whether there was an explicit conflict between the executive
agreement and the state law. Without such a conflict the dissenting Justices would not allow an executive agreement to preempt
a state law. Justice Ginsburg also noted that “the notion of ‘dormant foreign affairs preemption’ with which Zschernig is associated resonates most audibly when a state action ‘reflects a state
policy critical of foreign governments and involves ‘sitting in
judgment’ on them.’” 92
Applying the case law above to a scenario in which states
attempted to link to a foreign trading system, the lack of a coher-

ent federal policy on GHG regulation at this point strongly points
to the constitutionality of such a linkage. The biggest potential
problem would occur if there is federal legislation that makes
mention of international linkages, or if the President makes clear
statements concerning national priorities for GHG regulation
that conflict with linking domestic trading systems with their
international counterparts.
Perhaps just as important, any attempt to link to foreign
emissions trading systems will be viewed very differently from
the Crosby and Giannoulias cases. States attempting linkages
will not be disparaging or otherwise passing negative judgment
on foreign parties, as occurred in those cases involving state laws
prohibiting or restricting commerce with rogue nations. Without
that factor, it is difficult to imagine how courts could find any
sort of interference with America’s foreign policy prerogatives.
Thus, cap-and-trade system linkages are likely permissible overtures to international partners, particularly if the federal government still has not undertaken a comprehensive scheme of carbon
regulation.

Conclusion
State governments continue to demonstrate leadership in
combating climate change—from adopting energy efficiency
standards to enacting renewable portfolio standards to developing cap-and-trade programs aimed at reducing carbon dioxide
emissions, often as part of regional compacts. At the same time,
the Congress is in the process of developing national climate
change legislation and agencies in the Executive Branch are
defining their roles. As the federal and state governments begin
regulating the same areas of the economy and the environment,
the potential for conflicting programs arises.
State programs are potentially vulnerable to a variety of
constitutional challenges, including through the Commerce,
Compacts, Supremacy, and Foreign Affairs clauses. As the federal government solidifies its approach to global climate change
over the next several years, the likelihood for preemption of
state programs will become more evident. It is apparent now,
however, that state programs are in serious jeopardy if the federal government actively seeks to restrict state authority. If the
current or future President does not want states to play an active
role in climate change regulation, he or she will have several
constitutional tools at their disposal to handicap the states’ abilities to create programs that reduce GHG emissions.
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